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AbstrAct
A reduction in the wage premium for skilled labor –and a consistent re-
duction of overall wage inequality-has played an important role in explaining 
the fall of income inequality in Latin America during the 2000-2014 period. 
Consistent with that pattern, wage inequality declined in Mexico since 2000. 
This paper investigates the possible channels on why the wages of high-skilled 
workers have declined. Using data from Mexican labor surveys for the period 
between 2000 and 2014, we investigate if the decline was driven by wages 
declining more sharply for younger or older workers. We find that wages of 
older workers declined and the decline was more pronounced the older the 
cohort.  This would seem to support the hypothesis that older workers’ skills 
became obsolete. 
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resumen
Una reducción en la prima salarial del trabajo calificado -y una reducción 
constante de la desigualdad salarial global- ha jugado un papel importante en 
la explicación de la caída de la desigualdad del ingreso en América Latina du-
rante el período 2000-2014. En consonancia con ese patrón, la desigualdad 
salarial disminuyó en México desde el año 2000. Este trabajo investiga las 
posibles causas de por qué los salarios de los trabajadores altamente cua-
lificados han disminuido. Utilizando datos de encuestas sobre el trabajo de 
México para el periodo 2000- 2014, se investiga si la reducción se debió a 
una disminución de salarios más acusada para los trabajadores más jóvenes o 
más viejos. Nos encontramos con que los salarios de los trabajadores de edad 
se redujeron y el descenso fue más pronunciado cuanto mayor es la cohorte. 
Esto parece apoyar la hipótesis de que las cualificaciones de los trabajadores 
de más edad se volvieron obsoletas.
Palabras clave: Educación; Universidad; Cohorte; Desigualdad; Méjico.
JEL codes: I24, I25, J20, J31, O54.
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1. introDuction
Unlike other regions in the world, Latin America went through an important 
period of reductions in income inequality at the dawn of the twenty first cen-
tury (Lopez-Calva and Lustig, 2010; Lustig et al., 2016). The fact that it also 
happened in a period of sustained growth –mildly interrupted by the global 
crisis of 2009-attracted the attention of analysts and policy makers to under-
stand the factors associated with these trends. Researchers consistently found 
that there has been a process of wage compression, where the wage premium 
for skilled labor decreased in most countries (Rodriguez-Castelan et al., 2016). 
The agenda was then advanced in order to delve into the drivers of the re-
duction in wage inequality and its sustainability, in an effort to disentangle 
its supply-side determinants from drivers related to the demand for different 
types of labor and the role played by institutional factors, such as minimum 
wages and unions.5 This paper contributes to such agenda by exploring the 
heterogeneity of the changes in wages across age groups in Mexico and the 
factors associated to such dynamics.
Indeed, consistent with the regional pattern, since 2000 wage inequality in 
Mexico declined (Figure 1). This has taken place during a period of significant 
educational upgrading of the labor force and declining relative wages, espe-
cially for workers with tertiary education. Campos et al. (2014) decompose the 
change observed in wage inequality into changes in returns to human capital 
(formal education and work experience) and changes in human capital endow-
ments. Their findings suggest that the endowment effect has been unequalizing 
while the wage structure effect is equalizing and larger.6 
5 Recent research has focused on disentangling supply, demand, and institutional factors (Azevedo et 
al., 2013; Lustig, et al., 2016; Messina, et al. 2016; Levy and Lopez-Calva, 2016).
6 Even though there was significant educational upgrading and the distribution of the education stock 
became more equal, these changes were unequalizing because of the so-called “paradox of progress” 
(see Bourguignon et al. 2005). Depending on the convexity of returns and the point of the education 
equalization process at which the country finds itself, a reduction in the inequality of educational 
attainment may lead to a rise in earnings inequality. Indeed, as Gasparini et al. (2011) point out, the 
‘paradox of progress’ has been a pervasive phenomenon in Latin American labor markets in the last 
couple of decades.
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figure 1. wAge inequAlity of All workers 
gini coefficient of hourly wAges
relAtive supply AnD relAtive wAges of college-
eDucAteD workers
Notes: Authors’ calculations using quarterly Labor Force Surveys from 2000 to 2015. Estimations 
consider all individuals with a positive number of hours worked and valid wages, ages 23-65. Panel 
B shows the proportional change with respect to 2000:2 of the relative supply of workers (share of 
individuals with college) and relative wages (log of hourly wage of workers with college education) 
with respect to rest of workers. This paper aims to establish whether there is evidence in support of a 
degraded tertiary effect. Sample includes men and women.
A decline in the relative wages of skilled workers can occur if one or more 
of the following situations exists: the wages of the low-skilled grow faster than 
the wages of the skilled; the wages of the low-skilled increase while the wages 
of the skilled workers decline; or the wages of the low-skilled workers decline 
more gradually than the wages of skilled workers.  In Mexico, relative wages 
declined as a result of the last two, depending on the period. As illustrated in 
Figures 2 and 3, the average hourly wage of college-educated workers declined 
during the entire period while the wages of the rest of workers rose up to 2008. 
As a result of the global financial crisis, all wages declined from 2009 onwards 
but those of college-educated workers fell at a faster pace (Figure 3). This re-
sult contrasts with what the literature finds in more advanced countries, which 
shows an increase in inequality mainly due to wage increases of high-skilled 
workers (Autor et al. 2008; Goos and Manning, 2007). Hence, we investigate 
the possible channels on why the wages of high-skilled workers have declined.
The average hourly wage for college-educated workers declined at a rate of 
approximately 2 percent per year between 2001 and 2014. Given that during 
this period the share of college graduates in the workforce rose from 14 to 18 
percent, the decline in relative (and absolute) wages may be a simple matter 
of supply outpacing demand. An alternative explanation (and not mutually 
exclusive) could be that the fall in returns to college education is the outcome 
of a process intrinsic to a particular age group.  Younger workers, for example, 
could be experiencing a decline in their average wage because—as a result of 
the large expansion of tertiary education institutions since 1995—their ter-
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tiary education is not of the same quality on average as that of younger work-
ers in previous cohorts. For example, in the period 1984 – 1994, university 
enrollment increased by 1.95 percent per year, while during the 1994-2000 
period, it increased by 5.4 percent per year. The skills acquired through ter-
tiary education could have become of lower quality, either because the new 
post-secondary institutions are of lower quality and/or because the marginal 
student has lower abilities.  We call this the “degraded tertiary effect”.7 Another 
possibility (again, not mutually exclusive) is that older workers in recent co-
horts receive lower wages than their counterparts in previous cohorts because 
their skills no longer match what the markets demand or because there was 
a skilled-labor-saving technical change. We call this the “skills-obsolescence 
effect.” 
figure 2: AverAge monthly eArnings
A. less thAn college b. college
Notes: Authors’ calculations using quarterly Labor Force Surveys from 2000 to 2015. Earnings are in 
constant Mexican Pesos 2014:1. Earnings refer to full-time workers (at least 30 weekly hours of work) 
with a valid wage. It includes all workers (men and women): salaried, self-employment and owners. 
Earnings below and above the 1 and 99 percentile (within gender and education group) are dropped. 
Lines are smoothed by a moving average with a 0.4 weight to the current observation and 0.3 to the 
previous and post observation.
In this paper, we analyze whether there is evidence of a degraded tertiary 
education effect, a skills-obsolescence effect, or both. We do this by examining 
a series of results and assess their consistency with the presence-or absence-
of either effect. We posit that if the decline in returns to the college-educated 
is the result of the deterioration of the quality of new entrants (or a mismatch 
in demand and supply that affects the younger workers in recent cohorts in 
particular), this should be reflected in a skewing of the wage distribution to-
wards lower-wage earners among those with tertiary. In order to verify this, 
we apply the classic Datt-Ravallion decomposition method that disaggregates 
7 See Lustig, Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2013) and Camacho et al. (2016). 
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changes in the proportion of people below the poverty line into growth and 
redistribution effects (Datt and Ravallion, 1992). We use the average wage of 
the college-educated in the base year in lieu of the poverty line.   
figure 3: Difference in log hourly wAge. bAse perioD 2008:1.
Notes: Authors’ calculations using quarterly Labor Force Surveys from 2000 to 2015. Earnings refer 
to full-time workers (at least 30 weekly hours of work) with a valid wage. It includes all workers 
(men and women): salaried, self-employment and owners. Earnings below and above the 1 and 
99 percentile (within gender and education group) are dropped. Lines are smoothed by a moving 
average with a a 0.4 weight to the current observation and 0.3 to the previous and post observation.
We also examine the evolution and distribution of wages of workers by 
cohort and experience (measured by age). The degraded tertiary effect (or a 
demand-supply mismatch among younger cohorts) should show as a decline in 
the average hourly wage of younger workers in recent cohorts vis-à-vis workers 
of the same experience level in older cohorts. In particular, workers who have 
entered the job market after the large surge in institutions of tertiary educa-
tion, should show a more pronounced decline in their average wage than other 
age groups. Given that the surge took place in the 1990s, this should have 
affected workers who were born after 1975.  In particular, if the decline in the 
average wage of younger workers results from an increase in the proportion 
of younger workers with a degraded tertiary degree, one would expect an in-
crease in inequality of the younger group of workers over time.  
Disentangling unambiguously the degraded tertiary and cohort effects 
from the pure supply quantity effect is not possible with the data used in this 
paper. Younger and older cohorts are participating in the same market and 
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could affect each other’s wages. Camacho et al. (2016) have explored the de-
graded tertiary effect in Colombia, using data that allows them to identify the 
college of origin of specific workers, and do not find support for the hypothesis 
that deterioration of quality explains the reduction in returns. 
This paper, however, contributes to our understanding of the factors ex-
plaining the reduction in wage inequality in Mexico by showing that, indeed, 
there are heterogenous patterns across workers in terms of change in wages, 
which implies that the recent increase in supply has not affected equally work-
ers of different cohorts, even though they are alike in terms of other observable 
characteristics. Moreover, these patterns do not seem to be consistent with the 
“degraded tertiary” effect, given that wage levels decreased relatively less and 
their dispersion decreased among younger workers. The pattern does seem 
to align with the “skills-obsolescence effect”, with wages falling more for older 
workers. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data analyzed in 
this paper as well as some descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the analy-
sis of the evidence. Section 4 summarizes the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. DAtA
We use the Labor Force Survey for each quarter starting in the second 
quarter of 2000. The Mexican labor force surveys are very similar to the Cur-
rent Population Survey applied in the United States or other labor force sur-
veys around the world. From 2000 to 2004 the survey used is the “Encuesta 
Nacional de Empleo”, and from 2005 to 2014 it is the “Encuesta Nacional 
de Ocupación y Empleo”.8 Even though the questionnaire is slightly different, 
most of the key labor questions are the same across surveys: earnings, hours 
of work, occupation, etc; while the sampling is the same in both. The labor 
force surveys are representative at the national and state level as well as by 
metropolitan area. In each quarter, approximately 120,000 households are in-
terviewed. The surveys include socioeconomic and demographic information, 
but do not include any information on consumption or assets at the household 
level. 
Given that our focus is on college graduate workers, we restrict the sample 
to individuals aged 23-65 years old (inclusive). For employment patterns, we 
use the full sample and define ‘work’ as the positive number of weekly hours of 
work in the week of reference. For the wage sample, we use full-time earnings 
defined as earnings of those with more than 30 hours of work in the week of 
reference. When calculating hourly wages, we divide the monthly earnings by 
hours of work times 4.33. We drop earnings below and above the 1st and 99th 
8 Both surveys have the same sample design. Although it is not common to employ the two surveys, 
we use them to provide a complete picture of wages in Mexico since 2000. Other studies that use 
both surveys are Campos, Hincapie and Rojas (2012) and Calderon (2014). 
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percentile within education groups from the sample.9 To calculate the hourly 
wage statistics for all workers, we use the expansion factor in the survey times 
hours of work.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for three years in the data: 2000, 
2007 and 2014. Panel A includes the full sample and Panel B includes only the 
working sample (those with positive hours of work in the week of reference). 
This distinction is important due to the selection into the labor force mainly by 
women. There are three large changes in the Mexican population and work-
force in the 2000-2014 period. First, there is a substantial increase in the 
female labor force participation. From 40 percent in 2000, it increased to 48 
percent by 2014. This increase has been on hold since the macroeconomic cri-
sis in 2008. Second, the proportion of individuals with a university diploma has 
increased, while at the same time the proportion of individuals with primary or 
less has declined substantially. This is satisfied both in the full and the working 
samples. In the case of women, there is positive selection into the workforce 
by education. Higher educated women are more likely to enter the labor force 
than less educated women. Third, average incomes declined substantially af-
ter the macroeconomic crisis of 2008. In the results that follow, we explore 
the role of different explanations on the decline of wages of higher-educated 
workers. We present our results for both men and women in order to analyze 
whether there are important changes by gender in labor market outcomes.
tAble 1: Descriptive stAtistics
 2000 2007 2014
 All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
A. Full Sample
N 853,078 400,306 452,772 806,406 372,734 433,672 409,152 191,897 217,255
Age 39.1 39.2 39.1 40.3 40.4 40.1 40.9 40.9 41.0
% Work 62% 87% 40% 64% 86% 46% 65% 84% 48%
% Married 75% 78% 71% 73% 77% 70% 71% 75% 69%
% Rural 35% 35% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 35% 34%
% Primary or 
less
54% 51% 56% 45% 43% 48% 36% 34% 37%
% Junior High 
School
19% 21% 18% 23% 25% 22% 28% 29% 27%
% High School 16% 14% 17% 17% 16% 18% 21% 20% 21%
% College 11% 13% 9% 14% 16% 12% 16% 17% 15%
9 This restriction does not affect the trend of the results. Without this restrictions the results are 
noisier each year. The literature on wage inequality generally follows this convention, see Katz and 
Autor (1999), and Autor et al. (2008).
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B. Working 
sample
N 536,771 345,765 191,006 530,018 320,346 209,672 268,357 160,115 108,242
Age 38.5 38.8 37.8 39.7 40.0 39.1 40.3 40.4 40.0
% Full-time 
work
85% 92% 73% 82% 89% 71% 82% 88% 72%
Monthly 
Earnings
$6,133 $6,449 $5,330 $6,937 $7,386 $6,003 $5,714 $6,018 $5,116
Hourly Wage $29.3 $30.0 $27.1 $32.5 $33.5 $30.0 $26.8 $27.4 $25.6
% Married 72% 80% 57% 71% 79% 58% 70% 77% 58%
% Rural 33% 36% 28% 32% 34% 28% 33% 36% 28%
% Primary or 
less
49% 51% 46% 41% 42% 38% 32% 34% 30%
% Junior High 
School
20% 22% 18% 25% 26% 22% 29% 30% 26%
% High School 17% 14% 22% 18% 16% 22% 21% 20% 23%
% College 14% 13% 15% 16% 15% 18% 18% 16% 21%
Notes: Authors’ calculations using quarterly Labor Force Surveys. Each year uses information from 
all available quarters: 2000 uses quarters 2-4, 2007 uses quarters 1-4, 2014 uses quarters 1-2. Full 
sample uses all individuals ages 23-65, and working sample uses all individuals with positive hours 
of work ages 23-65. Monthly earnings and hourly wages are restricted to full-time workers (at least 
30 weekly hours of work) and are in constant Mexican Pesos of the first quarter of 2014. Married 
includes cohabitation. Rural refers to individuals living in localities with less than 15,000 inhabitants. 
Primary or less refers to individuals with less than 9 years of schooling, Junior High School refers to 
individuals with at least 9 years but less than 12 years of schooling, High School refers to individuals 
with at least 12 but less than 16 years of schooling, and College refers to individuals with at least 16 
years of schooling. 
3. results
Our results can be summarized as follows.  The Datt-Ravallion decomposi-
tion (Table 2) shows that most of the change in the proportion of workers below 
the baseline wage is due to a shift in the distribution rather than to a change 
in its shape.  The skewing towards the lower end of the wage distribution exists 
but it is very small.  Based on this result, there does not seem to be evidence 
consistent with a degraded tertiary effect or demand-supply mismatch of skills 
for the younger workers in particular.  However, this exercise is not sufficient 
to rule out the presence of labor market dynamics that hurt the younger age 
group in particular. This is because the Datt–Ravallion decomposition is anony-
mous in the sense that we are not able to track who is losing relative to other 
workers. For example, it is possible that changes in the age composition of the 
workforce are such that although younger workers are increasingly receiving 
lower wages, their share in the workforce is declining.  
102 Raymundo m. Campos-Vazquez, Luis F. Lopez-CaLVa, noRa Lustig
tAble 2: DAtt-rAvAllion Decompositions: log hourly wAge. restricteD to workers with college.
 2000 2007 2014  
A. Males
% less than mean in 2000 0.5088 0.5375 0.6655
2000-2007 2007-2014 2000-2014
Difference -0.0286 -0.1279 -0.1567
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Growth Effect -0.022 -0.136 -0.1486
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Redistribution -0.0065 0.008 -0.008
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
B. Females
% less than mean in 2000 0.5115 0.5049 0.6094
2000-2007 2007-2014 2000-2014
Difference 0.0066 -0.1045 -0.0979
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Growth Effect 0.02 -0.116 -0.1073
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Redistribution -0.014 0.012 -0.009
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
 Notes: Authors’ calculations using quarterly Labor Force Surveys. Each year uses information from 
all available quarters: 2000 uses quarters 2-4, 2007 uses quarters 1-4, 2014 uses quarters 1-2. 
Sample restricted to individuals working full-time (at least 30 weekly hours of work) age 23-65 and 
college education. Log hourly wage in constant Mexican Pesos of the first quarter of 2014. Standard 
errors in brackets.
What does the evolution of wages and wage inequality by cohort and age 
group tell us? Figure 4 shows that the wages of college-educated workers de-
clined for all ages but they declined faster for the oldest group (51+) and 
slower for the youngest one (23-30).  This is more evident for males than for 
females. If the degraded tertiary hypothesis is the only channel to explain 
changes in wages, then we should expect a decline in wages for younger work-
ers. However, as Figure 4 shows, this did not happen for Mexican workers. 
This is another piece of evidence against the degraded tertiary hypothesis. 
The observed pattern would be more consistent with the skills-obsolescence 
explanation. It could be that both hypothesis are playing a role in determining 
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wages, but insofar as these results show, the degraded tertiary hypothesis has 
a secondary role in explaining large wage changes over the period for college 
educated workers.
figure 4: eArnings by Age group AnD genDer: 2000-2015. restricteD to workers with college.
A. mAles b. femAles
Notes: Authors’ calculations using quarterly Labor Force Surveys from 2000 to 2015. Earnings are in 
constant Mexican Pesos 2014:1. Earnings refer to ful-ltime workers (at least 30 weekly hours of work) 
with a valid wage. Includes workers with college education: salaried, self-employment and owners. 
Earnings below and above the 1 and 99 percentile (within gender and education group) are dropped. 
Lines are smoothed by a moving average with a 0.4 weight to the current observation and 0.3 to the 
previous and post observation.
As discussed, if a degraded tertiary effect is taking place, we would expect 
that inequality among younger workers would increase more (or decrease less) 
than for workers of other age groups. However, as shown in Figure 5, wage 
inequality among the younger age group declined. There is no clear difference 
in the pattern of inequality change among workers of different ages (whether 
males or females). Figure 5 shows a decline in inequality for all workers, in-
cluding college-educated older workers. Skill-obsolescence (or lower relative 
demand for older workers in recent cohorts) might imply that high-wage col-
lege-educated older workers are earning a lower wage and, hence, inequality 
for this group would decline. Thus, Figure 5 is more consistent with the skills-
obsolescence effect than with the degraded tertiary education hypothesis.10
10 In a degraded tertiary effect we expect that some workers (those with higher education but lower 
skills) to have lower wages while the rest of workers can maintain or increase their wages. This should 
cause an increase in inequality. On the other hand, skill-obsolescence should decrease inequality as 
high-wage workers are substituted by capital or younger workers.
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figure 5: inequAlity eArnings (gini) by Age group AnD genDer: 2000, 2007 AnD 2014. restricteD 
to workers with college.
A. mAles b. femAles
Notes: Authors’ calculations using quarterly Labor Force Surveys from 2000 to 2014. Earnings are in 
constant Mexican Pesos 2014:1. Earnings refer to full-time workers (at least 30 weekly hours of work) 
with a valid wage. Includes workers with college education: salaried, self-employment and owners. 
Earnings below and above the 1 and 99 percentile (within gender and education group) are dropped. 
Lines are smoothed by a moving average with a 0.4 weight to the current observation and 0.3 to the 
previous and post observation.
In order to analyze the roles of the degraded tertiary and skill-obsoles-
cence hypotheses, we calculate earnings over time by cohort. This calculation 
is important because it depicts how wages have changed over time for the 
same type of workers.11 The degraded tertiary hypothesis implies that wages 
for recent cohorts should decline due to increased competition for the same 
jobs and that the quality of those workers is inferior to that of previous gradu-
ates.  The skill-obsolescence hypothesis implies that older cohorts experience 
a decline in their wages over time. 
tAble 3: meAn log hourly wAge by cohort. mAles with college eDucAtion.
    Year     
Cohort 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015
1950-1954 4.29 4.28 4.19 4.25 4.16 4.14 3.99 3.93 3.85
1955-1959 4.17 4.22 4.18 4.16 4.15 4.01 4.00 3.89 3.95
1960-1964 4.11 4.13 4.11 4.16 4.17 4.03 3.96 3.96 3.94
11 We cannot follow the same workers as the database employed is not a panel. However, we can use 
synthetic panels following the same age group over time. If the sampling is random and there is no 
change in labor force participation (or at least it is random) then wages come from the “same” type 
of workers. 
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1965-1969 4.12 4.14 4.08 4.13 4.09 3.97 3.95 3.93 3.97
1970-1974 3.96 4.06 4.01 4.05 4.07 3.98 3.96 3.93 3.92
1975-1979 3.75 3.83 3.86 3.92 3.97 3.86 3.89 3.87 3.87
1980-1984  3.74 3.75 3.72 3.77 3.77 3.74
1985-1989      3.56 3.54 3.59 3.68
Notes: Authors’ calculations using quarterly Labor Force Surveys from 2000 to 2015. Earnings are in 
constant Mexican Pesos 2014:1. Earnings refer to full-time workers (at least 30 weekly hours of work) 
with a valid wage. Includes workers with college education: salaried, self-employment and owners. 
Earnings below and above the 1 and 99 percentile (within gender and education group) are dropped. 
Sample restricted to male workers between 23-65 years old.
Table 3 shows the results for male earnings with college education. There 
are several important aspects to highlight. First, the oldest cohort (1950-
1954) shows declines in wages since the beginning of the period. The earnings 
of that cohort have declined close to 40 percent. This is the largest decline in 
earnings for any cohort. Second, the cohorts 1955-1959, 1960-1964, and 
1965-1969 show stagnant earnings between 2000 and 2008; nevertheless, 
their earnings all decline after the macroeconomic crisis. This decline is largest 
for the oldest cohort in this group, 1955-1959. Third, mid-age cohorts, 1970-
1974 and 1975-1979, show the largest gains in earnings between the period 
2000 and 2008. Their earnings increase between 11 and 22 percent. Howev-
er, after the macroeconomic crisis, their earnings fall, arriving at the same level 
as in 2000-2002. Fourth, the younger cohorts, 1980-1984 and 1985-1989 
do not show a decline in earnings even after the macroeconomic crisis. How-
ever the gains of this cohort are modest, 5 and 2 percent between the first and 
final year observed. These gains are substantially lower than for older cohorts.
Is there evidence that workers of newer cohorts are receiving a lower wage 
when they enter the workforce? This phenomenon could be interpreted as 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that new entrants are, on average, 
of increasingly lower quality than new entrants in the preceding cohorts. As 
Table 3 shows, there is no evidence that this is occurring in the Mexican labor 
market. In fact, the younger cohorts are the only ones that show an increase in 
their earnings over time. 
However, ideally we would like to compare earnings at the same age across 
cohorts when they enter the labor force. This is not possible given that the 
length of the panel is short, and the largest expansion in college enrollment 
was in the late 1990s. Ideally, we need to compare the cohorts in the early 
2000s with the cohorts in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, we can compare 
wages for three cohorts when they were 23-25 years old. The cohort 1975-
1979 had 23 years old (on average) in 2000, the same occurs for the cohort 
1980-1984 in 2006 and the cohort 1985-1989 in 2010. The earnings of 
the cohorts 1975-1979 and 1980-1984 are approximately the same when 
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they both enter the labor force. But the cohort 1985-1989 shows substantially 
lower earnings at the time of entry into the labor market (close to 20 percent). 
It is difficult to disentangle the effect of lower college quality due to the mac-
roeconomic crisis in 2008.
In order to explore these issues more deeply, we regress the average of the 
log wage of college-educated workers against age and cohort variables. For 
cohorts 1950-1954 to 1975-1979 we have yearly data from 2000 to 2015 
(96 observations), and for the cohort 1980-1984 (1985-1989) since 2003 
(2008) when they start their labor life (21 observations). In total, we obtain 
117 observations. The variable cohort is defined such that 0 represent the 
oldest cohort (1950-1954) and 7 the youngest cohort (1985-1989). Simi-
larly, age is normalized to start at 0. Hence, the constant is interpreted as the 
average log wage of college-educated workers at cohort 0 (1950-1954) when 
they are 23 years old. Table 4 shows the results of that regression. Estimating 
the contribution of age, cohort and its interaction, suggests the opposite: i.e., 
the wage of new entrants has been increasing with each cohort. The cohort 
coefficients imply that there is an increasing pattern of earnings up to the 
1970-1974 cohort, and then earnings decline for the latter cohorts.12 So, the 
decline of wages among college-educated workers coincides with the timing of 
the increase in supply around 2000, when workers in the cohort 1975-1979 
start their labor life. The age coefficients imply a regular inverted U-shape for 
the age-earning profile. The negative coefficient of the interaction between the 
cohort and age variables is important. This implies that the earnings of younger 
cohorts start to decline at a younger age over time. In other words, the peak in 
earnings is obtained at younger ages for recent cohorts and the peak is lower 
than previous maximum earnings in previous cohorts. For females, we find rela-
tively similar results but the peak in wages for recent entrants to the labor mar-
ket is for the cohort 1975-1979 and then newer cohorts obtain lower wages 
when they start their labor life. Table 4 also includes a regression that controls 
for the size of the cohort (log of the proportion of individuals in that cohort with 
respect to all college-educated individuals in a year). The results are similar to 
those in the first two columns. Supply is relevant to determine wages of males 
but not of females, which is likely driven by the increase in female labor force 
participation in the period. The key result holds: younger cohorts are earning 
less than older cohorts when they were starting their labor life and that wages 
decline at the end of the labor life.13
12 The difference between average log wage for cohort 1970-1974 (cohort number 4 in the regression, 
cohort 0 refers to cohort 1950-1954) and 1975-1979 (cohort number 5 in the regression) is a decline 
of 3.9% (first we multiply each cohort coefficient by cohort number and then take the difference).
13 In estimations not shown, we estimate the regressions with a dummy variable for the period 2009-
2015 (post-crisis) with similar results. 
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tAble 4: cohort regressions. log hourly wAge. restricteD to workers with college.
 Males Females Males Females
Specification 1: 
Not including own supply
Specification 2: 
Including own supply
Cohort 0.1624 0.3269 -0.1236 -0.0937
[0.083] [0.063] [0.011] [0.007]
Cohort2 -0.0224 -0.0331
[0.006] [0.005]
Age 0.0625 0.0943 0.0094 0.0129
[0.016] [0.012] [0.005] [0.004]
Age2 -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0005
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Cohort*Age -0.0082 -0.0125 0.0003 0.0001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Log Supply -0.0438 0.0018
[0.0262] [0.018]
Constant 3.5632 2.8814 4.3452 4.1957
[0.264] [0.199] [0.081] [0.061]
Observations 117 117 117 117
Adj. R-squared 0.931 0.955 0.923 0.936
Notes: Authors’ calculations using quarterly Labor Force Surveys. Cohort starts in 0 and ends in 7, 
where 0 is the oldest cohort and 7 is the youngest cohort. Age starts at 0 (Age-23). The constant can 
be interpreted as the average log hourly wage for the oldest cohort with an average age of 23. Log 
supply refers to the log of the proportion of individuals in that cohort with respect to total college-
educated individuals. Specification 2 does not include the quadratic term given that it is no longer 
significant.
In order to disentangle the roles of labor demand across age groups, we 
analyze the pattern of employment by occupation level. We use the two-digit 
occupation category in the labor force surveys until 2012.14 Figures 7 and 8 
illustrate that the group that has been hurt the most is the category of Direc-
tor. Their share in total employment declined (especially among older workers) 
14 It is not possible to go up to 2014 because the occupation category changed in 2012. Although 
the National Statistics and Geography Institute (INEGI) includes a dictionary to match occupation 
categories between time periods, there are still large discontinuities for some of the occupations in 
2012.
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and their real wages fell the most. This result suggests that labor demand for 
highly-paid occupations has declined substantially, however this has affected 
both young and older workers.
figure 7: chAnge in relAtive employment by Age group. restricteD to workers with college.
A. Age 23-44 b. Age 45-65
Notes: Authors’ calculations using quarterly Labor Force Surveys from 2000 to 2012. Relative 
employment refers to the share in employment of that occupation out of total employment. Restricted 
to workers with college education. Lines are smoothed by a moving average with a 0.4 weight to the 
current observation and 0.3 to the previous and post observation. 
figure 8: monthly eArnings by Age group. restricteD to workers with college.
A. Age 23-44 b. Age 45-65
Notes: Authors’ calculations using quarterly Labor Force Surveys from 2000 to 2012. Earnings are in 
constant Mexican Pesos 2014:1. Earnings refer to full-time workers (at least 30 weekly hours of work) 
with a valid wage. It includes workers with college education: salaried, self-employment and owners. 
Earnings below and above the 1 and 99 percentile (within gender and education group) are dropped. 
Lines are smoothed by a moving average with a 0.4 weight to the current observation and 0.3 to the 
previous and post observation.
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4. mAin finDings AnD conclusions
In sum, there is no evidence supporting the hypothesis that the decline in 
the wages of college-educated workers has been driven by what happened to 
younger workers. If the degraded tertiary effect or the demand-supply mis-
match exists among younger workers, it has been more than offset by other 
forces. On the other hand, the evidence suggests that there is a process that 
negatively affects older workers, those of 50 and more in particular.  Older 
workers, for example, do not feature the typical continuously increasing con-
cave wage function; rather, they experience a sharper decline in their wage. 
These findings are summarized in Table 5. We also observe that the age at 
which the slope becomes negative occurs at younger ages with each cohort 
(Table 3). This could be evidence of an accelerated skills-obsolescence effect. 
However, the year at which the wage becomes negative for the college-edu-
cated of every cohort coincides with the year in which Mexico entered into 
recession: 2008. 
tAble 5: summAry of eviDence
Hypothesis Shown in Degraded tertiary Obsolescence / Labor Saving
Datt-Ravallion Table 2 No evidence Not applicable
Evolution of wages 
by age
Figure 4 No evidence
Some evidence that older wor-
kers’ salaries fell more rapidly
Wage inequality by 
age
Figure 5 No evidence
Evidence consistent with high-
wage older workers´ wages 
falling relatively to other older 
workers’ wages
Evolution of wages by 
cohort
Table 3
Some evidence with the 
very young cohorts but it 
overlaps with year of macro-
economic crisis
Evidence that the wages of 
older workers decline 
Cohort regression Table 4
No evidence. On the 
contrary, the average 
entry-point wage has been 
increasing over time for the 
younger cohorts
Evidence that the wages of 
older workers decline in the 
more recent cohorts and that 
this accelerates with how 
recent the cohort is.
This paper examined whether there is evidence of a degraded tertiary edu-
cation effect, a skills-obsolescence effect or both in explaining the decline in 
the relative wages of skilled workers in Mexico, which has been observed since 
the early 2000s. The fall in returns to college education may be the outcome 
of a process in a particular age group, for example, lower quality of tertiary 
education in younger workers—the “degraded tertiary education effect”. An-
other explanation is that older workers in recent cohorts receive lower wages 
than their counterparts in previous cohorts due to a skill mismatch with the 
demands of the economy or to a technical change that makes skilled-labor 
redundant—the “skills-obsolescence effect”.
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Using data from Mexican labor surveys for the period between 2000 
and 2014, we do not find evidence to support the hypothesis that the de-
cline in the relative wages of skilled workers is explained by a degraded 
tertiary effect or a demand-supply mismatch among younger workers. If 
these effects have taken place, they have been more than offset by other 
forces. There is evidence, however, of a process that is taking a negative 
toll on workers of 50 years of age and older. Rather than a continuously 
increasing concave wage function, these workers present a sharper decline 
in their wage. 
In addition, there is some support of an accelerated skills-obsolescence 
effect, which is suggested by the fact that the age at which the slope becomes 
negative occurs at younger ages with each cohort. Nevertheless, this finding 
must be interpreted with caution as the year at which the wage becomes nega-
tive for the college-educated of every cohort (2008) is the same year in which 
the country entered into recession. 
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